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[So F. No. 19200. In B{lnk. Aug. 23, 1955.]

NADINE GIGLIOTTI, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and
Appellants, v. JOSEPH ERNES'l' NUNES, Respondent;
BHODA GIGLIOTTI, Cross-Defendant and Appellant.
[So F. No. 19201. In Bank. Aug. 23, 1955.]

ARTHUR MATTS, a Minor, etc., et aI., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JOSEPH ERNEST NUNES, Respondent;
RHODA GIGLIOTTI, Cross-Defendant and Appellant.
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Automobiles-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common
knowledge that one of the most hazardous of highway traffic
maneuvers is a left turn by a ponderous, slow-moving vehicle
in the face of oncoming traffic.
[S] Death - Instructions - Presumptions. - Where testimony respecting alleged negligent acts and oonduct of a decedent
necessarily must be produced by witnesses other than deceased,
an instruction that deceased is presumed to have exercised
ordinary care for his own concerns is proper except that if the
fact proved by uncontradicted testimony produced by the
party seeking to invoke the presumption, under circumstances
which afford no indication that such testimony is the product
of mistake or inadvertence, is wholly irreconcilable with the
presumption, the presumption is dispelled.
(8] Negligence-Presumptions.-Although there is no room for
the presumption that a person takes ordinary care for his own
eoncerns where the driver or other person whose claimed negligence is at issue himself testifies to his actions at the time
involved, if such person be deceased or unable to testify by
reason of loss of memory, the fact that other witnesses for
the parties testify fully as to the acts and conduct of the
allegedly negligent person does not deprive the party relying
on the presumption of the benefit thereof unless the testimony
which he himself produces, under circumstances which afford
no indication that the testimony is the product of mistake or
inadvertence, is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption
sought to be invoked•
•
[8] See Oal.Juf., Negligence, § 122; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 290
~~

p

McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 188; [2] Death, § 84;
[3] Negligence, §124; [4] Df'uth, ~42: f5] Autolllobiles, ~189j
[6, 7] Automobiles, § 385-2; [8] Automobiles, § 355-2; [9] Pleading, § 185 (2).
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[4] Death-Wrongful Death-Presumptions.-In an action brought
to recover for the wrongful death of an automobile driver, the
presumption that a person takes ordinary care for his own concerns would apply if contributory negligence by the driver
were made an issue.
[5] Automobiles-Presumptions.-In an action for damages arising out of a collision of vehicles resulting in the death of the
person driving the car in which plaintiffs were riding, no presumption of due care on the part of the deceased driver would
carry with it the presumption of negligence on the part of
defendant.
[6] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions - Presumptions.
-In an action for injuries sustained by.minors when the automobile in which they were riding as guests collided with a
truck which had started to make a left turn at an intersection,
refusal to give plaintiffs' requested instruction on the presumption of due care on the part of the automobile driver,
who was killed in the collision, constituted prejudicial error
where, though the jury were instructed that any negligence of
deceased driver could not be imputed to plaintiffs, the conduct
of such driver was important in determining whether the truck
driver's conduct was negligent, and where the evidence was
in sharp conflict as to some circumstances of the accident and
would have supported a verdict other than one for defendant.
[7] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions - Presumptions.
-In an action for injuries sustained by minors when the automobile in which they were riding collided with a truck at an
intersection, to which defendant filed a cross-complaint against
the mother of two of the minors, who was also riding in the
automobile, for damage to the truck, defendant's recovery
against the mother was based on alleged negligence of the
automobile driver, imputed to her, and refusal to give her requested instruction on the presumption of due care on the
part of such driver, who was killed in the collision, was prejudicial error.
[8] Id.-Instructions-Presumptions.-In an action for injuries
sustained by minors when the automobile in which they were
riding collided with a truck at an intersection, plaintiffs'
proposed instruction that the presumption of ordinary care on
tke part of the automobile driver, who was killed in the collision, "shall prevail and control your deliberations until and
unless it is overcome by sati~factory evidence" could not confuse the jury as implying that defendant had the burden of
"overcoming" such presumption and that "overcome" could
only mean by a preponderance of evidence, where such instruction did not mention either "burden of proof" or "prep onder&Ilce of evidence-"
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[9] Pleading-Amendment-Tillle to ADlt:nd.-Refu3al to permit
a cross-defendant to amend her answer to a truck owne7s
cross-complaint for damages 'to his truck arising out of a
collision of vehicles, so as to set up failure of the truck owner
to file a cross-complaint in a prior action brought against him
by such cross-defendant, did not constitute an abuse of discretion where on two prior occasions, when counsel for cresscomplainant offered the file of the prior action in evidence in
an attempt to prove that the judgment in his favor therein
was res judicata on the question of his negligence, counsel for
cross-defendant objected on the ground that such file or e.nything in connection with the previous trial was incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial, and where the court on the first
occasion pointed out that the prior judgment was consistent
with no negligence on the part of either cross-complainant or
the driver of the other vehicle and, on the second occasion, the
court reserved its ruling with the comment that if it allowed
the records of the prior action, it might force cross-complainant out of court, and counsel for cross-defendant did
Dot then promptly amend the answer.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. John D. Foley, Judge. Reversed.
Actions for damages for personal injuries arising out of a
collision of vehicles at an intersection, in which defendant
filed a cross-complaint for damages to his truck. JUdgment
entered on a verdict dellying recovery against defendant on
original complaint, and judgment for defendant on crosscomplaint, reversed.
James F. Boccardo and Edward J. Niland for Appellants.
Campbell, Custer, Warburton & Britton, Frank L. Custer
and W. R. Dunn for Respondent.
SCRAUER, J .-In these two personal injury actions, arising out of a motor vehicle accident and consolidated for trial,
the four plaintiffs as well as the cross-defendant Mrs. Rhoda
Gigliotti appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict denying recovery against defendant, Joseph Edward Nunes, for
the personal injuries and awarding him judgment ag~inst
Mrs. Gigliotti on his cross-complaint for damages to his truck.
We have concluded that plaintiffs and Mrs. Gigliotti are correct in their contention that the trial court committed error
pr.ejudicial to them in refusini to .:ive a r~ueated instruction
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on the presumption of due care and that the judgment must
therdore be reYel'sed, ann. further, that no abuse of diserEtion is shown in the comt's refusal to permit Mrs. Giglict~j to file a proffered amendment to her answer to the crosscomplaint.
• In November, 1947, a 1946 Dodge sedan in which plaintiffs
(milJors at the time) were riding as guests collided with a
truck vwned and operated by defendant and cross-complainant,
Joseph Nunes. The Dodge was being driven by one Walters
who died as a result of injuries received. Nunes' answer to
plaintiffs' amended complaints denied negligence generally,
and pleaded affirmative defenses of contributory negligence,
,~~;~mmption of risk, imputed negligence of the driver of the
Dodge, unavoidable accident, res judicata and estoppel. Plaintiffs' motions to strike the latter two defenses were grallted.
Nunes also filed a crosG-complaint for damages to his truck
against the minor plaintiffs in both actions and brought in as
an additional cross-defendant Rhoda Gigliotti, mother of
two of the plaintiffs. In the cross-complaint it is alleged that
Walters, driver of the Dodge, operated it negligently while
acting as the servant, agent and employe of the cross-defendants. l
At the conclusion of the trial motions for nonsuit on the
cross-complaint were granted as to the minor cross-defendants
but denied as to Mrs. Gigliotti. Verdict and judgment followed in favor of defendant Nunes and against plaintiffs as
to the causes of action alleged in the complaint, and also in
favor of Nunes for $300 on his cross-complaint against Mrs.
Gigliotti. Motions of plaintiffs and Mrs. Gigliotti for a new
trial were denied.
As grounds for reversal plaintiffs2 urge error in the instructions, and prejudicial misconduct of defendants' counsel.
Mi'3. Gigliotti als~ contends that the court should have permitted her to plead or prove that the cause of action stated in
the cross-complaint against her was barred by reason of defendant's failure to plead it in a prior action she had brought
against him (see Code Civ. Proc., § 439).
IThe record indicates that the Dodge was owned by neither Walters nor
Mrs. Gigliotti, but by a third person who is not a party to these actions.
The basis of Nunes' recovery against Mrs. Gigliotti on his cross-complaint
is his claim that Walters was acting as her agent in driving the Dodge.
'In discussing the contentions made on appeal the word" plaintiffs"
will also refer to cross-defendant MIa. Gigliotti unleaa oth@lwiae ill·
dicated in the ~t of the opinioa.

I
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The accident occurred about 3 p. m. at the intel's~ctiO:l of
Bayshore Highway and Berryes!:ia Road ill 81m Jose. At this
point Bayshore runs north and south and is divided into three
lanes, each 11 feet wide. On each side is an asphalt shoulder
9 feet wide. Berryessa Road crosses Bay£hore at about a 4·5
degree angle, running from southeast to northwest, and is
divided into two lanes, each 9 feet wide. Berryt-::;:.;a widens
out into a curve on each side where it joins the shoulders of
Bayshore. Approximately 40 feet south of the center of the
intersection, railroad tracks cross Bayshore at an angle, running parallel to Berryessa. On each side of the tracks, aL:.Hlt
10 or 12 feet distant therefrom, and parallel thereto, are
double white lines extending across the center and right lanes
of each approach on Bayshore to the railroad crossing.
Defendant Nunes was driving his true!; and trailer south
on Bayshore, intending to turn left into Berryessa. The truck
was about 32 feet in length, and attached to it by a tiebar was
a trailer, 23 feet 10 inches in length, equipped with cattle
racks. The overall length of the equipment was 59 feet 10
inches, and it weighed more than 19,500 pounds. The Dodge
sedan driven by Walters, in which plaintiffs and Mrs. Gigliotti were riding and with an empty horse trailcr attached,
was proceeding north on Bayshore. Mrs. Gigliotti and one
of the plaintiffs were in the front seat beside 'Valters and the
other three plaintiffs were in the back seat. As defendant's
truck turned left onto Berryessa it and the Dodge collided.
As a result Mrs. Gigliotti and the plaintiffs suffered personal
injuries and, as already noted, Walters was fatally injured.
Evidence as to the circumstances of the accident is in sharp
conflict. Defendant testified that he had been driving u3tween
12 and 15 miles an hour, in the center lane of Bayshore, and
Elowed down as he reached the Berryessa intersection. A
. "good block" from Berrye£sa he put the mechanical arm signal of his truck out for a left turn, and left it there. He saw
two groups of automobiles approaching from the south, the
first consisting of two or three cars traveling at an "ordinary
speed" of 40 to 50 miles an hour; they were an "ordinary
driving distance" apart. The second group consisted of
three cars, the first of which was 700 to 800 feet behind the
last car of the first group. Defendant paid no attentiorl to
the speed of the cars in the second group. He was 200 or
300 feet from the intersection when the first car of the first
group reached it. He stopped or nearly stopped when he
reached the intersection just as the last car of the first group
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passed through it. rrhe first car of the second group was
then about 800 feet from the intersection. Defendant put
his truck in gear to begin the left turn; just before he started
it he saw the Dodge pulling the horse trailer come out from
be~illd the first two northbound cars and pass them in the
middle lane; defendant paid no attention to the speed of the
Dodge at that time. At a previous trial he testified that he
had already made part of the turn before looking to the right
again. The Dodge, 600 or 700 feet from Berryessa when it
passed the two cars, pulled back into the east lane. \Vhen defendant was in the center of the east lane he saw the Dodge
about 300 to 350 feet away and estimated its speed at 65
miles an hour. Defendant started to apply his brakes; he
knew he could not get out of the way in time. The Dodge
did not diminish its speed, but at about the railroad tracks
swerved to the right in an attempt to go in front of defendant's truck. The vehicles collided when the front of the truck
was about 2 feet east of the Bayshore pavement. Defendant
did not know whether his truck was moving or stopped at
that moment, but if moving it was at no more than 3 miles
an hour. From the time he had seen the Dodge 300 to 350 feet
down Bayshore the truck had gone about 8 feet, and from
the point where it had commenced the left turn into the east
lane it had traveled from 12 to 15 feet at 3 miles an hour to
the point of impact. The truck was moved 3 or 4 feet sideways
by the impact, and the vehicles came to rest with about threequarters of the left side of the truck's bumper imbedded in the
Dodge. Defendant denied that he had told anyone that he had
never seen the Dodge.
One Fowler, testifying for defendant, stated that he was
in his car at the stop sign on Berryessa on the east side of
Bayshore when he saw defendant's equipment approaching.
The left turn signaling arm was straight out, indicating a
left turn, although it was pointing downward after the accident. The witness first saw the Dodge about 500 feet south,
going about 55 miles an hour, and saw no cars go through
the intersection before the Dodge. Defendant's truck was
traveling 10 to 1::! miles an hour and started to turn with no
change in speed. The Dodge was then 150 to 200 feet from
the intersection and still traveling at the same speed. As soon
as the truck started to turn the witness knew the accident
was going to happen because the Dodge was so close that
defendant could not get his 60-foot truck and trailer across in
front of it. As the truck reached the east lane the witness
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saw the Dodge start to swerve to its right; when the front of
the truck was in the middle of the east lane the Dodge was
150 or 200 feet from the intersection. A highway patrol officer
testified, however, that the witness Fowler told him at the
scene of the accident that he, Fowler, could give no information because he had been watching the truck make its turn
and had not seen the Dodge; Fowler denied this.
Other witnesses for defendant testified that his signaling
device was out for a left turn, that the Dodge had been traveling about 45 miles an hour possibly a block or half a block
from Berryessa, and that its speed at the moment of impact
was about 50 miles an hour.
Truck driver Whittaker testified, for plaintiffs, that he had
been driving east on Berryessa, toward Bayshore, and first
saw defendant's truck north of the intersection and traveling
at 20 to 25 miles an hour. Defendant's truck slowed down
and meanwhile two northbound cars on Bayshore went through
the intersection. Just after the second car passed, the truck
began to turn left right in front of the Dodge; the Dodge was
then about 80 feet south of the intersection, near the railroad
tracks, and moving between 40 and 45 miles an hour. The
truck, which was going 4 to 5 miles an hour when it began
the left turn, picked up speed until it was traveling 8 to 10
miles an hour at the moment of impact. The Dodge veered to
the right when the truck began to turn and traveled about
64 feet to the point of impact; it was then going 35 to 40 miles
an hour. The left front bumper of the truck hit the left front
side of the car and moved the car sideways 4 or 5 feet. The
Dodge left tire marks 4 to 5 feet long extending easterly from
the point of impact; it also left "skid marks" behind it to the
south. After the collision the witness asked defendant why
he had pulled out in front of the Dodge and defendant replied
that he didn't see it.
Two other witnesses testified that they heard defendant
state, at the scene of the accident, that he had let two other
cars go by but had not seen the Dodge. The witness Penny,
also testifying for plaintiffs, stated he was driving behind
defendant, was still behind him when defendant's truck started to turn left, and saw no mechanical or arm signal indicating
an intent to turn left; just before the truck started the left
turn the witness saw the Dodge at about the railroad tracks
traveling 40 to 45 miles an hour; he noticed the Dodge because he "knew it was awful close for the truck to try to
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u1 the truck hit the Dodge, pushing
tJw "La' sit:, ways about 3 feet.
Pia intir!' Arthur Matts, who was riding in the front seat
of tilt' Dodge, testified that the Dodge had been \raveling about
40 Illiles au hour a block or two before the accident; he esti~lateu that the truck was about 150 feet north of the intersection when he first saw it and the Dodge some 150 or more
feet south of the intersection; when the Dodge reached the
railroad tracks the truck began to turn left right in front of
the Dodge; he felt the Dodge swerve to the right and felt
the application of the brakes; he was knocked out by the
collision and did not see the two vehicles come together or
know where the impact occurred. Mrs. Gigliotti placed the
speed of the Dodge at about 35 to 40 miles an hour along
BaysllOre, and also testified that the truck turned left when
the Dodge was about 50 feet south of it, near the railroad
tracks, and Walters then applied the brakes of the Dodge. Of
tIlt' other three minor plaintiffs two had no memory concerning the happening of the accident, and the third testified the
Douge was going about 35 miles an hour and was about
at the middle of Berryessa Road when the truck turned in
front of it.
Although other evidence also favors each of the parties,
it is apparent from that summarized above that while the
jury's veruict for dcfcndant is not as a matter of law unsupported by the evidence, a verdict in favor of plaintiffs and
of Mrs. Gigliotti would find substantial support in the testimonies of defendant. himself, and his witnesses and in the
physical circumstances as well as in the evidence produced
by and on behalf of the plaintiffs. [1] It bears mention as
a matter of common knowledge that one of the most hazardoml of all highway tl'afJic maneuvers is a left turn by a ponderons, slow moving vehicle in the face of oncoming traffic.
As ground for reversal, it is first contended that the court
erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' requested instruction on
the presumption of due care (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963. subd. 4)
on the part of Walters, the deceased driver of the Dodge.
[~]
As expressed in Scott v. Burke (1952). 39 Ca1.2d 388,
:~0-1 [247 P.2d 313], it is settled lmv that whel.'e alleged negligent acts and conduct of a decedent are at issue before the
court and the "testimony respecting such acts and conduct
necessarily must be produced by witnesses other than the deceased, . . . an instruction that the deceased is pt'csumed to
have exercised ordinary CUl't! for his OWll COllcerus iii •••
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proper" except that if the fact proved by uncontradicted testimony produced by the party se~king to invoke the prc:mmption, "under circumstances which afford no indication that
the testimony is the product of mistake or inadvertence .••
is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption ••• the latter
is dispelled and disappears from the case."
[3] Although there is no room for the presumption where
the driver or other person whose claimed negligence is at
issue himself testifies to his actions at the time involved (see
Speck v. Sarver (1942),20 Ca1.2d 585, 587-588 l128 P.2d 16]),
the rule is established that if such person be deceased or unable to testify by reason of loss of memory, the fact that other
witnesses for the parties testify fully as to the acts and conduct of the. allegedly negligent person does not deprive the
party relying on the presumption of the benefit thereof unless the testimony which he himself produces "under circumstances which afford no indication that the testimony is the
product of mistake or inadvertence . . . is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption sought to be invoked." (W eslberg
v. Will de (1939),14 Ca1.2d 360,365-368 [94 P.2d 590J ; Mar
Shee v. Maryland Assur. Om·p. (1922), 190 Cal. 1, 9 l210 P.
269J; Ohakmakjian v. Lowe (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 308, 313 [201
P.2d 801J.) Plaintiffs' evidence in the present case is not
irreconcilable with the presumption.
The benefit of the presumption has frequently been held
available to plaintiffs in wrongful death act.ions (t;ee A11lhony
v. Hobbie (1945), 25 Ca1.2d 814, 819-820 [155 P.2d 826];
Westberg v. Willde (1939), supra, 14 Ca1.2d. 360; EUison v.
Lang Transportation Co. (1938), 12 Ca1.2d 355, 358-360 [84 P.
2d 510] ; Mundy v. Marshall (1937),8 Ca1.2d 294 [65 P.2d 65] ;
Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co. (1931), 212 Cal. 540 [299 P.
529] ; see also Mar Shee v. Maryland Ass'Ur. Corp. (1922),
supra, 190 Cal. 1), as well as to one who by reason of loss of
memory is unable to testify concerning his conduct at and
immediately before the time of the accident. (See Scott v.
Burke (1952), supra, 39 Ca1.2d 388, 394, and cases there
cited.) [4] In an action brought to recover for the wrongful death of VI alters the presumption plainly woulJ apply
if contributory negligence by ,\Valters \7,-e~e made an issue.
[5] Since, however, it likewise is the rule that no 'presumption of due care on the part of the deceased driver \Valters would carry with it the presumption of ncgligp}h;r 011 tile
part of defendant Nlllle~; (see (Jreene v. A!ellf·son, 1'. & S. Jil.
By. Co. (1953), 120 Cal..t\.pp.2d 135, 139-141 [2GO P.2d 834,

...

)

94

GIGLIOTTI

v.

NUNES

[45 C.2d

40 A.L.R.2d 873]), and since in the present case the jury were
instructed that any negligence of Walters could not be imputed to plaintiffs, defendant argues that there was no issue
of negligence of Walters so far as concerns the minor plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs urge that the conduct of Walters was important,
nevertheless, in determining whether defendant's conduct was
negligent (i.e., the speed and distance away of the Dodge
driven by Walters and what defendant should have observed
with respect to it before turning the truck left in front of the
Dodge), and that if the due care presumption had been before the jury they might have concluded that Walters was
not driving at an excessive or negligent speed, that he was
observing the speed limit of 45 miles an hour for a passenger motor vehicle drawing a trailer (established by Veh.
Code, § 515.5, as to which an instruction was given), and (in
view of the evidence that the Dodge left tire marl<:s some 30 or
40 feet before the point of impact) that Walters must have
been less than 100 feet from the point of impact when defendant began his left turn. Hence the jury could have further
concluded that defendant was negligent in attempting a left
turn of his ponderous and slow moving equipment, approximately 60 feet in length, in front of another vehicle approaching the intersection so closely as to constitute an immediate
hazard, and that defendant's negligence in thus violating
section 551 of the Vehicle Code (as to which an instruction
was given) would be a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries.
[6] Although no case had been cited or discovered wherein
applicability of the presumption has been affirmed or denied
upon a congeries of circumstances exactly the same as those
here present, we are convinced that plaintiffs' position accords with the principles which have governed or underlain
application of the rule in the cas¢,3 .:!ii.ed. Certainly nothing
in section 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure refutes that
view. Because the evidence, as already shown: was in such
sharp conflict as to some of the circumstances of the accident,
and would have amply supported a different verdict, the error
in refusing to give the due care presumption instruction is
prejudicial.
[7] With respect to the cross-defendant, Mrs. Gigliotti, defendant's recovery against her was based upon alleged negligence of Walters, imputed to her, and consequently the presumption was likewise applicable and prejudicial error resulted from l'l'fusal to give it.
Defend.ant, however, urges that the due care instruction of-
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fered by plaintiffs was erroneous in that it would have tended
to confuse the jury on the matter of burden of proof.s
[8] Defendant argues that although admittedly the court
correctly instructed the jury that the plaintiffs had the burden
of proving the allegations of the complaint by a preponderance
of evidence, nevertheless by the statement in plaintiffs' proposed instruction that the presumption of ordinary care on
the part of Walters "shall prevail and control your deliberations until and unless it is overcome by satisfactory evidence"
the jury would have understood that defendant had the burden of "overcoming" the presumption and that "overcome' J
could only mean by a preponderance of evidence. The due
care instruction, however, does not mention either "burden
of proof" or ' 'preponderance of evidence,' , and, further,
the language attacked by defendant was expressly approved by
this court in Westberg v. Willde (1939), supra, 14 Ca1.2d
360, 364-365 (see also cases there cited). Thus the failure to
give the instruction cannot be excused because of its form.
Other alleged errors urged by plaintiffs as to jury instructions as well as asserted prejudicial misconduct on the part
of counsel for defendant may not occur on a new trial and
therefore need not be discussed here.
[9] Finally, cross-defendant Mrs. Gigliotti contends that
the trial court erred to her prejudice in refusing to permit her
to plead or prove that the cross-complaint against her was
barred by section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 After
all parties had rested Mrs. Gigliotti asked leave to file an
amendment to her answer to the cross-complaint to set forth a
second defense alleging that the "cross-Complainant is es-The instruction as offered reads as follows: "I instruct you that
there is a legal presumption that the deceased, Leonard Walters, was
obeying the law at the time and place of the accident in question and
that he was exercising ordinary care for his own concerns at the time
and place of said accident. This presumption is in itself a species of
evidence, and it shall prevail and control your deliberations until and
unless it is overcome by satisfactory evidence. This presumption is disputable, but unless it is adequately and sufficiently controverted, you,
the jury, are bound to find in accordance with the presumption that the
deceased, Leonard Walters, was obeying the law and was exercising
ordinary care for his own concerns and was not negligent at the time
and place of the accident. It is evidence in the ease and is sufficient
in and of itself to support a verdict of finding on your part that the
said deceased was careful at the time and place of the accident in
question. "
·Section 439: ' 'If the defendant omits to set up a counterclaim upon
a cause arising out of the transaetion set forth in the complaint as tIle
foundation of the plaintiff's claim. neither he nor hi~ ansignee can
afterwards maintain an action against the plaintiff therefor."
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tOlJP;'(l 1'1'0111 asserting the matters set forth in said CrossCOIII[lLiiilt ullder the provi~ions of Section 439 of the Code
of Ci\·il Procedure ... ; that the issues and matters set forth
in sai,l (~I.·oss-Complaint arise out of the same transaction and
~lecid('lIt as was litigated in a prior action entitled, 'Rhoda
n ig·J iotti . . . , Plaintiffs, versus Joseph Ernest Nunes . . .,
Dd('llllullts,' and numbered 69532 in the files of this Court,
and that in said prior action said Cross-Complainant was ent.itled to, but failed to, assert the matters now set forth in said
Cross-Complaint." Counsel for Mrs. Gigliotti in offering the
amendment stated his recognition that "it lies within the
Court's discretion to permit an amendment of the pleadings,
of course," and at the same time stated that "in support of
th(~ proof under the amendment, if allowed, I would like to
introduce for the limited purpose of this defense and for no
other purpose, the action filed, Action No. 69532, which establishes the prior . . . fail ure of the . . . Cross-Complainant
to set up any Cross-Complaint in that action •.. " The court
denied kave to file the amendment.
No abuse of the court's' discretion in so ruling appears.
The record shows that on two occasions during the trial
counsel for Nunes offered the file of the prior action between
Mrs. Gigliotti and Nunes in evidence in an attempt to prove
that the judgment in Nunes' favor therein was res judicata
on the issue of Nunes' negligence and actually adjudicated
negligence 011 the part of \Valters, driver of the Dodge. On
both occasions counsel for Mrs. Gigliotti objected vigorously
on the ground that the files or "anything in connection with
the previous trial . . . is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial . . . " On the first occasion the court pointed out
that the prior judgment was likewise consistent with no negligence ou the part of either Nunes or Walters and denied the
otter of proof. On the second occasion the court reserved
it~, ruling, with the comment that if it allowed -the records of
the prior action in evidence it might force Nunes out of court
on his cross-complaint, "as apparently it is conceded" that
the prior action arose out of the same accident. Counsel for
l'\'IrS. Gigl iotti did not then take advantage of the court's
(:Ollllllent to attempt to promptly amend her answer to the
eross-compJaillt, but instead waited until all of the evidence
was in and both sides had resteu. Even if we assume that
if the file had been permitted in evidence Mrs. Gigliotti could
have taken advantage of it to establish that Nunes' crosscOllllliaint against her was within the scope of the issues in the
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prior action and so was barred (see Blumenthal v. Liebman
(In::;2), 109 CaI.App.2d 374, 378-379 [240 P.2tl 699]), nevertheless, under the circumstances we cannot hold that as a
matter of law the trial court transgressed the broad area of
its discretion in refusing permission to file the amendment.
For the reasons above stated the judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
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TRA YNOR, J.-I dissent.
Defendant Nunes had the burden of proving that the deceased driver Walters was negligent. Accordingly, there is
no basis for invoking a presumption against defendant that
Walters was exercising due care. (See Speck v. Sarver, 20
Cal.2d 585, 590 [128 P.2d 16], dissenting opinion; Scott v.
Burke, 39 Ca1.2d 388, 402 [247 P.2d 313], dissenting opinion.)
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September
21, 1955. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

